First rule of fighting terrorists: don’t do their job for them
Tony Abbott has deployed his senior ministers, including Julie
Bishop and George Brandis, to get out the government’s anti-terrorism
message.
AAP/Lukas Coch
It appears that Australia might be put on a higher threat alert level. ASIO director-general David Irvine’s comments
on a possible increase in the terrorism threat level (which came into
force in 2003) have created a wave of flurry, concern and nervous
anticipation. As Irvine explained:
The notion of a threat level at medium is that an attack
is possible or could occur. If we raise it to high it means an attack is
likely.
Certainly, a fundamental security challenge is how intelligence and
police agencies can best deal with potential home-grown terrorists and
their allies. For instance, Britain has raised its threat level to “severe” in response to events in Iraq and Syria. So how should the Australian government and its citizens best respond?
Back to the future
Despite Osama Bin Laden receiving a bullet
to the head in May 2011 and a weakened al-Qaeda - which is on the run
and characterised by paralysis, incompetence and infighting -
Australia’s terrorism threat level is potentially poised to rise to from
medium to high for the first time since inception.
This seems to revolve around deteriorating conflicts in the Middle
East, the evils of Islamic State (IS) and Sunni militia groups and
salvos about “Aussie jihadists”. About 60 Australians are reportedly fighting in either Iraq or Syria.
Yet every measure put forward to manage the threat of citizens being
involved with extremist groups abroad should not be understood as
automatically acceptable or validated. A plausible strategy for
countering IS has not yet been clearly articulated. And talking more
openly about the greatest sources of funding for IS, including the role of Saudi Arabia, would inject a bit more honesty and intricacy into the debate.
It is worth noting that over that past decade many have argued that
Australia’s decision to join the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was never a
straight-forward “mission accomplished”. Rather it ultimately
exacerbated existing ethnic and religious tensions, in turn making
Australia less safe from terrorism.
It directly led to the “balkanisation” of Iraq. Adding insult to
injury, purported WMDs eventually stood for “weapons of mass
disappearance”, while the dictator Saddam Hussain had no direct relationship with the tragedy of 9/11.
The ‘Team Australia’ narrative
This has been a muddying period of scatter-gun political exchanges, mixed security narratives and gloomy media reporting.
We have, for instance, had the Abbott government insist
that renewed or enlarged participation in military operations in Iraq
and Syria will not put Australia at increased risk. Yet both
intelligence agencies and government have been anxious to win support
for expanded powers under new security legislation.
Similarly, while team Abbott has appeared eager to focus on an
escalating terrorist situation at home and abroad, security assessments
have not been in lock-step with political attempts to jump-start a new dialogue of national security menace. The threat status remained stubbornly unchanged.
This might change. Yet the stronger terror assessment scenario
painted by ASIO does seem rather odd. Irvine chose to speculate publicly
about the threat alert being raised to the second-highest level,
ostensibly before giving formal advice to the government.
Based on ongoing assessments, either a threat is likely to occur or
it is not. If so, why the delay? If not, why prematurely raise a
“worst-case” scenario? Citizens remain stuck in terror limbo.
Further, this drip-feed of vague warnings is being packaged by policymakers with a hyper-legislative insistence on introducing another round of “tough” terror laws.
While some measures appear justifiable – such as up-to-date powers to
suspend passports - many others do not. Some proposals remain decidedly
inconsistent with past recommendations by watchdogs like the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor.
Overall, it can be argued that many shortcomings
and the lack of practical fine-tuning evident in core elements of
Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation are the result of undue haste.
Governments have rushed to pass laws without appropriate scrutiny and
related checks and balances. We seem to be stuck on a rinse-and-repeat
cycle to keep terrorising ourselves.
A fine line between public alert and panic
The head of ASIO publicly musing about terror threats has undoubtedly
had a virtually identical impact to the anticipated actual adjustment
(or non-adjustment) of the National Terrorism Public Alert System. It
has grabbed headlines and accelerated political chatter and public
speculation.
Problematically, this has created rolling confusion. Much work
remains to be done to keep uncertainty about terrorism in perspective.
The alert system has limited usefulness in guiding people’s
movements. It is not tied to any specific action – unless self-imposed
and completely arbitrary.
Do we stay home? Do we avoid public transport or airports or crowded movie theatres or the AFL final series?
Do we shun strangers with beards? Do we re-read (or re-find) our Howard
government-issued fridge magnets for instructions while setting our
mobile phones to automatically dial the terrorist hotline when our
spider-sense tingles (sorry, I can never remember the number)?
This type of “alert and alarmed” scenario tends to lead in a couple
of directions: it either creates wider public paranoia or greater public
scepticism. Neither is particularly helpful for an effective,
sustainable and clear-eyed counter-terrorism strategy.
Serving the terrorists' agenda
A variety of policymakers and media are doing their best to
contribute to the manipulation of revived fears about terrorism. Social
media in particular have become highly effective in spreading violent
extremist ideology and propaganda. Brutal decapitations such as that of American journalist James Foley are instantaneously available worldwide.
But imagine that the most effective weapon against the West for the
IS is actually terror. Imagine that terrorists are hoping to provoke
shock and fear; they aim to terrorise. Imagine that these ugly videos
are entirely ineffective in changing the direction of the US in its
involvement with expanded air campaigns and drone strikes against IS.
That would leave the only substantial impact these beheadings can
have on Western audiences as a psychological one of building IS into a
sort of shadowy, omnipresent super-villain that is hell-bent on world
domination.
Yet the noise emanating from IS is mostly crude bluff and ludicrous
chest-beating. It is critical to match its well-echoed and grandiose
intentions with a calculation of its actual capacity to form a
self-proclaimed caliphate throughout the Middle East, North Africa and
large parts of western Asia and Europe. This capacity is zero. It is
based on an illusion.
IS is a threat to specific people in parts of Iraq and Syria. It
might dictate terms within some lawless and poorly defended areas. But
IS does not have the ability to march into Pakistan. Or to take Baghdad
(being “close” to Bagdad does not count). In fact, this splinter
movement has struggled to hold the riverside town of Dhuluiya, which is part of a belt of Sunni Muslim towns.
IS is in ongoing battles not only with US hellfire missiles but with
rival jihadist, terrorist and rebel groups. As al-Qaeda eventually
realised, the IS brand of savagery and its core blood-thirsty
organisation will continue to alienate support from both local and
global Islamic communities.
In short, IS is a nasty piece of work, but it is not a global game-changer.
Frustratingly, while making nonsensical noises about IS power, reach
and authority, it is head-shaking that the Prime Minister would then
reward IS propaganda by implying that such unbridled violence and
accompanying beheadings could happen on Australian soil before long.
The instinct to “do something” and heroic calls to strong vigilant
action might be good politics. However, such heavy-handedness is a
careless and unhealthy national security stratagem.
What next?
The bad news is that the conflict in Iraq and Syria will remain an incubator for a new generation of terrorists.
While individual motivations and profiles will vary, foreign fighters
from all parts of the globe are joining the combat. The problem of war
travellers who go to fight in foreign locations and return home after
operating in radicalising environments is a serious security challenge.
Issues like detaining or arresting citizens before they have left for
a conflict zone – without solid evidence - will continue to be
complicated.
The good news is that the threat of foreign fighters is both
manageable and marginal. The coherence and capabilities of the IS
splinter group should not be overstated.
Another bottom line is that these Australian foreign fighters do not
represent the wider Islamic community – IS is keen to kill all Muslims
who they deem to be “infidels”. (This makes many calls for “community”
solutions by the overwhelming moderate Muslim majority in Australia
overly simplistic.)
EPA/Michael Reynolds
This is not a clash of civilisations.
Australian citizens still have more chance of being killed by bee
stings or car crashes than by a rare, albeit conceivable, home-grown
terrorist attack.
Interestingly, former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger recently warned that traditional state-based threats remain a much more serious and long-term security headache.
I consider Iran a bigger problem than ISIS. ISIS is a
group of adventurers with a very aggressive ideology. But they have to
conquer more and more territory before they can became a strategic,
permanent reality.
The lesson is not to dismiss the IS threat but to respond in a
proportionate, carefully calibrated fashion, to avoid hyping terror
risks and to invest in smart counter-radical campaigns. The building of
public resilience - the ability of society to restore calm and for
citizens to adapt rationally to random events and unexpected changes
(from terror strikes to shark attacks) - remains indispensable.
The more immediate hazard is pointless overreaction and political
exploitation of public fears. The build-up of these kind of tensions
have had a track-record of leading into knee-jerk and totally
counter-productive policy initiatives – like the unnecessary Iraq
invasion of 2003. That had no clear national security benefit and
contributed to much of this latest mess.
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